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Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach
JOHN HOGAN Dublin City University
Introduction
Traditionally, with historical institutionalism, the choices made when an
institution is formed, or policy initiated, will have a persistent influence
over that policy ~Peters, 1999: 210!. However, crises can bring abrupt
institutional change, as they present leaders with an opportunity to enact
new plans and realize new ideas by embedding them in the institutions
they establish. Consequently, a regularly invoked interpretation of insti-
tutional change has divided history into “normal periods” and “critical
junctures,” during which major change is possible ~Gorges, 2001: 156!.
However, Pierson ~2004: 5–6! argues that “many of the key con-
cepts needed to underpin analyses of temporal processes, such as path
dependency, critical junctures, sequencing, events, duration, timing, and
unintended consequences, have received only fragmented and limited dis-
cussion.” This raises questions as to both the understanding, and employ-
ment, of these concepts. Consequently, critical junctures have remained
underexamined and insufficiently specified. Thus, this paper seeks to out-
line a framework within which to identify critical junctures. If we can
identify a critical juncture with some degree of certainty, then we can
point to a period of change as significant with greater confidence than
was previously possible.
In contextualizing where the remoulded critical juncture approach
fits within the wider political science literature, the paper will initially
focus on the approaches used by historical institutionalism to deal with,
and identify, change. The paper will then examine the characteristics of
critical junctures, the use of the approach and how the approach is remoul-
ded to give it a rigour it previously lacked. The remoulded approach is
then employed in a case study of the change in the ICTU’s influence
over public policy in Ireland in 1987 to see if this constituted a critical
juncture. The conclusion will summarize the main arguments of the paper:
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that remoulding the critical junctures approach improves our understand-
ing of the concept, and our ability to identify change.
Variation on the Examination of Institutional Change
Clearly, attentiveness to history is important, as tracing politics through
time is helpful for identifying the boundary conditions for particular theo-
retical claims. Even more significant, the emphasis historical institutional-
ists place on conjunctures, and sequencing, draws attention to the temporal
connections among social processes, and highlights the importance of
meso- or macro-level analysis of institutional configurations. Yet, despite
this, the significance of time and historical processes in historical insti-
tutionalism have been downplayed in deference to the attention devoted
to the institutional side of the approach. However, “questions of institu-
tional evolution and change have @also# attracted very little systematic
attention” ~Thelen, 2004: 24!. This dearth of attention to historical pro-
cesses, and institutional change, led political scientists to rely on societal
functionalism, and the actor-centred version of that approach ~Pierson,
2004!.
An alternative to functionalist explanations of institutional develop-
ment is path dependence. According to Thelen, “@t#his perspective has
been more prominent among scholars associated with historical institu-
tionalism” ~2004: 26!. It argues that early choices have a persistent influ-
ence thereafter ~Peters, 1999: 210!. Ikenberry ~1994: 16! captures the
essence of a historical institutionalist approach to path dependence in his
characterization of political development as involving critical junctures
and developmental pathways. In an effort to assess how process, sequence
and temporality can be incorporated into explanations, Haydu ~1998! goes
beyond the notion that past choices affect future process ~Mahoney, 2000:
510!. Cox ~2001! advocates using the constructivist perspective to expand
the path dependence approach, as this specifies the path-shaping power
of ideas, and individual action, to alter institutional configurations.
Mahoney’s ~2001! definition of path dependence sought to separate the
critical junctures of institutional formation from the long periods of insti-
tutional stability. This approach is akin to the concept of punctuated equi-
librium espoused by Jones ~2001!, and borrowed from neo-Darwinian
evolutionary theory ~Gould and Eldredge, 1977!. Greener ~2005: 62! sug-
gests that combining insights from morphogenetic social theory with the
concept of path dependence can provide a coherent framework for its
use. But ultimately, strong tools for understanding continuity were not
matched by equally sophisticated tools for understanding political and
institutional change ~Thelen, 1999: 388!. Path dependence seems to
encourage scholars to think of institutional change as either minor and
continuous or major and abrupt ~Streeck and Thelen, 2005!.
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In light of this, scholars have explored change by building on evo-
lutionary models in the life sciences ~Arthur, 1994; Jervis, 1997; Mahoney,
2000; Kerr, 2002; Pierson, 2004!. Consequently, political science may
move away from its fascination with physics and absolute laws, and look
more like the life sciences, with their emphasis on contingency, context
and environment. In this event, the goal will be to explain past ~evolu-
tionary! outcomes, and less to predict future ones. Ultimately, the neces-
sary conditions for current outcomes occurred in the past.
Thelen ~2004: 292! argues that “earlier generations of institutional
analysis focused primarily on the effects of different institutional config-
urations on policies and other outcomes.” However, of late historical
institutionalists have sought to demonstrate the ways in which institu-
tions are remade over time ~Thelen, 1999, 2000; Clemens and Cook, 1999;
Pierson, 2004!. The impetus behind this is dissatisfaction with research
concentrating either on the analysis of institutional reproduction or insti-
tutional change. Without denying the existence of critical junctures, this
research is discovering continuity in periods of upheaval, and gradual
change in periods of peace that eventually become major transforma-
tions ~Thelen, 2004: 292; Djelic and Quack, 2003: 309–10!. This research
views periods of change and stability as entwined.
Institutions are being viewed as changing in subtle but significant
ways by a variety of mechanisms, amongst which are the concepts of
layering, conversion, displacement and drift. Layering involves the plac-
ing of new constituents onto an established institution’s framework. This
can see new initiatives introduced to address contemporary demands, but
then adding to, rather than replacing, pre-existing institutional forms. Con-
sequently, older institutions will often have a highly “layered” quality
~Stark and Bruszt, 1998; Schickler, 2001; Pierson, 2001!. Conversion sees
the acceptance of new aims, and the integration of new groups, into insti-
Abstract. This paper improves our understanding of critical junctures, a concept employed in
historical institutionalism for exploring change. However, the concept lacks rigour, weakening
our ability to define critical junctures. Of late, academics have utilized other mechanisms to
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l’évolution de l’influence de l’Irish Congress of Trade Unions ~ICTU! sur les politiques pub-
liques en 1987.
tutions, as forcing change in the roles these institutions perform. Thus,
old institutions may persist, but be turned to different uses by newly ascen-
dant groups. Layering and conversion provide for a more nuanced analy-
sis of the kind of incremental change common in politics. However, it
must be remembered that in either case, the original choices are likely to
figure heavily in the current functioning of the institution. Displacement
occurs when new models emerge and diffuse, calling into question exist-
ing, and previously taken-for-granted, organizational forms and prac-
tices ~Streeck and Thelen, 2005: 19!. Where an institutional arrangement
dominates ~Orren and Skowronek, 2004!, it is vulnerable to change
through displacement, as conventional arrangements are questioned or
replaced in favour of new institutions and associated behavioural logics.
Drift relates to the fact that there is nothing automatic about institutional
stability ~Thelen, 2004!. Institutions need to be actively maintained, other-
wise they can stagnate through drift ~Hacker, 2002, 2005; Streeck and
Thelen, 2005!. Approaches that focus on the stability of existing institu-
tions miss the slippage resulting from the impact of the world upon them.
This brings us back to the issue of attentiveness to history, and the
question of how to conceptualize the starting point of analysis. “Because
the decision to select any particular event as the starting point of analy-
sis may seem arbitrary, the investigator is prone to keep reaching back in
search of the foundational causes that underline subsequent events in the
sequence” ~Mahoney, 2000: 527!. A meaningful beginning point is
required. In this situation, the crucial object is the factor that sets devel-
opment along a particular path, the trigger event ~Pierson, 2004: 46!.
Abbott ~1997! argues that periods of institutional genesis correspond to
critical junctures. The junctures are critical as they place institutional
arrangements on trajectories that are difficult to alter ~Pierson, 2004: 135!.
But, as Pierson argues above, critical junctures have received only lim-
ited discussion. If critical junctures are of such import to the discipline,
and yet have been so neglected, an examination of the approach is nec-
essary to see if there is room for improvement.
The Characteristics of Critical Junctures
The literature on critical junctures argues that they are characterized by
the adoption of a particular institutional arrangement, a choice of one
option from amongst alternatives ~Mahoney, 2000: 512!. Once an option
is selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial
point ~Levi, 1997!. Critical junctures establish pathways that funnel units
in particular directions. Once units begin to move in a particular direc-
tion they realize increasing returns, and continue in that direction
~Mahoney, 2003: 53!. Returns processes generate irreversibilities, remov-
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ing certain options from the subsequent menu of political possibilities
~Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 9!. With the returns process, the most impor-
tant implication is the need to focus on the branching point, the critical
juncture ~Pierson, 2000: 263!. According to this literature, the juncture
is critical as it triggers a process of positive feedback.
But, as Hacker ~1998, 2002! emphasizes, it is important to keep dis-
cussions of path dependence and critical junctures distinct, otherwise one
runs the danger of concept stretching ~Sartori, 1970!. Pierson ~2004!
argues that institutional stability can result from non-path-dependent
causes, implying that critical junctures should not be defined in part by
the assumption that they initiate a path-dependent process. A critical junc-
ture could lead to the existence of an institution whose persistence is not
due to path dependence, but instead stems from other sources of institu-
tional stability.
Nevertheless, a critical juncture points to the importance of the past
to explain the present, and highlights the need for a broad historical van-
tage point. Moreover, this “suggests the importance of focusing on the
formative moments for institutions and organisations” ~Pierson, 1993:
602!. While critical junctures are not the only source of change, they
can, nevertheless, discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering
change ~Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 184!.
The Use of Critical Junctures
The perspective from which critical junctures are analyzed has varied
greatly. Some critical junctures involve considerable discretion, whereas
others appear embedded in antecedent conditions. The duration of a crit-
ical juncture may involve a relatively brief period in which one direction
or another is taken, or it can constitute an extended period of reorienta-
tion ~Mahoney, 2001!. This analysis can focus on the underlying societal
cleavages or crises that precipitate a critical juncture, or it can concen-
trate primarily on the critical juncture itself. Nevertheless, central to this
approach is an understanding that change is a cornerstone of compara-
tive historical research and development.
The analysis of critical junctures has been influential in compara-
tive politics. In 1991, Collier and Collier developed a framework for ana-
lyzing change, to determine if certain periods constituted critical junctures
in the trajectories of national development in Latin America. Their defi-
nition of a critical juncture does not imply that institutional innovation
occurs in short episodes or moments of openness ~Thelen, 2004: 215!.
Although this definition does not imply the primacy of agency and choice
over structure in critical junctures, its openness to longer-term institu-
tional innovation, while highly commendable, means that it does not pro-
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vide a framework for determining at what point change is sufficient to
constitute a critical juncture. How can something that appears to be a
period of transition, or incremental change ~in their example the incor-
poration period in Peru took 23 years!, be considered a critical juncture?
There is no set of criteria identified, nor hinted at, beyond which one is
no longer confronted with a critical juncture, and is dealing with incre-
mental change.
Mahoney ~2000: 535!, seeking to conceptualize critical junctures,
argued that the contingent period corresponded to the adoption of an ini-
tial institutional arrangement. Using Mahoney’s criteria for specifying
the beginning of sequences helps make more plausible claims that cer-
tain outcomes are generated through a path-dependent process. Mahoney
~2001! tries to explain why the liberal period in the nineteenth century,
in five Central American countries, constituted critical junctures. “The
exact dates for this period differ for each country, though they roughly
correspond to the 1870–1930 period” ~Mahoney, 2001: 116!. For
Mahoney, critical junctures are seen as having taken decades to come
about, while their after-effects are of shorter duration. This raises ques-
tions as to the impact of those periods of change, and whether they were
in fact critical junctures, or just incremental changes as in conversion or
displacement, discussed above.
However, the concept of critical junctures has also been widely
employed in a diverse spectrum of research not particularly concerned
with long-term change. Garrett and Lange ~1995: 628! argue that elec-
toral landslides create critical junctures by producing overwhelming man-
dates for policy and0or structural change. Casper and Taylor ~1996! argue
that critical junctures can be used in analyzing periods when authoritar-
ian regimes are vulnerable to liberalization. The approach has also been
utilized in relation to national-specific incidents and crises. Examining
the watershed in American trade policy that was the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act of 1934, Haggard ~1988: 91! argues that unanticipated
events ~critical junctures!, in this case an economic depression, bring into
question existing institutions, and result in dramatic change. Vargas ~2004!
has used critical junctures to examine the dynamics of the conflict in
Chiapas, Mexico. Gal and Bargal ~2002! analyze the emergence of occu-
pational welfare in Israel using critical junctures, while Karl ~1997! refers
to multiple critical junctures in her analysis of how “petro-states” became
locked into deeply problematic development paths.
Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach
Although ongoing work on the concept of path dependence by Mahoney,
and others, has lent greater precision to previous formulations of critical
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junctures ~Thelen, 2003: 209!, this paper seeks to improve our under-
standing of the concept. It seeks to “flesh out the often-invoked but rarely
examined declaration that history matters” ~Pierson, 2004: 2!. This paper
argues that the critical junctures concept lacks rigour—it doesn’t offer a
set of basic criteria by which to assess potential critical junctures to dis-
cover if they are critical junctures or just change that has taken place
incrementally. Thus, a question that arises is how to distinguish between
a critical juncture, and incremental change? Where does one draw the
line as to what is, and what is not, a critical juncture? This is the decisive
weakness at the heart of the approach.
Thus, whilst answering this question may place restrictions on the
liberty with which the term can be employed, at least one will be able to
say with greater certainty what is a critical juncture. While acknowledg-
ing that developing a set of universally applicable standards for explor-
ing critical junctures would be near impossible in light of the vast milieu
of topics under examination in political science, at least moving in that
direction would constitute an advance for the discipline. Consequently,
the standards developed will have to be broad and encompassing, but
this will make the approach operationalizable and falsifiable. What is
more, this focus on the temporal dimension provides possibilities for shap-
ing some overlapping intellectual terrain for scholars working in diverse
research traditions ~Pierson, 2004: 8!. When confronted by the infinite
regress problem, a clear understanding of critical junctures would pro-
vide us with an unambiguous break in the chain with which to define
the starting point for analysis. As Mahoney ~2001: 8! puts it, “critical
junctures can provide a basis for cutting into the seamless f low of
history.”
As Collier ~1998: 5! suggests, the close familiarity researchers have
with their cases allows them to follow the long-standing advice of Prze-
worski and Teune ~1970! to construct “system specific indicators,” as
opposed to “common indicators.” To an extent, this is what is being advo-
cated, in that the remoulded framework, in setting out a range of general
standards that must be met for there to have been a critical juncture, leaves
the particulars of each standard open to the researcher. As Grix ~2004:
120! argues, this is the essence of social science research. In this situa-
tion, the more specific the framework, the less likely it is to be generally
applicable. Thus, we are left wrestling with contradictory necessities: the
need to be more rigorous—to advance the approach; and the require-
ment to be broadly applicable, if the approach is to be of use to the dis-
cipline as a whole. The only solution under these circumstances is to try
and develop an approach that is more rigorous than its predecessors, but
still as broadly applicable as possible.
To be able to recognize what is a critical juncture, we must be able
to recognize what is not. Not all events, even seemingly significant events,
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can reasonably be called critical junctures. A critical juncture must be an
event, prior to which a range of possibilities must exist, but after which
these possibilities will have mostly vanished. It is here at the narrowing
point, where possibilities close off, that we find ourselves, seeking a means
of defining critical junctures. But instead of assessing critical junctures
through counterfactual analysis ~Fearon, 1991, 1996!, this paper argues
for the development of a framework for assessing them. In doing so, it
avoids the problem of contingency in critical junctures, in that we will
now have a clearer understanding as to why an event is, or is not, a crit-
ical juncture, and thus why that event came to pass. Moving away from
contingency means that this approach cannot be linked to path depen-
dency, which itself works on the assumption of contingency in order to
encompass unpredictability ~Mahoney, 2000: 515!.
This paper argues that two separate elements are required for a crit-
ical juncture. First, it is necessary to identify the generative cleavage.
This will involve an examination of the tensions that lead to the period
of change. Second, the change must be significant, swift and encompass-
ing. Here, a critical juncture will not be defined by the assumption that
it initiates a path-dependent process. Non-path-dependent processes can
result in institutional stability, and path dependence is less common than
previously believed ~Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 2004; Streeck and Thelen,
2005!. Thus, it is conceivable that a critical juncture could witness the
subsequent creation of a durable set of institutions whose persistence is
not due to path dependence but to other sources of stability.
Generative Cleavage
An important part of the literature on critical junctures views them from
the perspective of cleavages, placing emphasis on the tensions that lead
up to the critical juncture. Since these cleavages are seen as producing,
or generating, the critical juncture, Valenzuela and Valenzuela ~1981: 15!
refer to them as generative cleavages. The generative cleavage examined
will vary depending upon the topic studied. “Traditionally, students of
institutional change focused on the importance of situations of large-
scale public dissatisfaction, or even fear, stemming from an unusual degree
of social unrest and0or threats to national security” ~Cortell and Peter-
FIGURE 1
Critical Juncture
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son, 1999: 184!. Wars, revolutions, coups d’état, economic crises, a change
in the balance of power, electoral landslides, demographic changes and
social movements may produce an overwhelming mandate for policy and
or0structural change ~Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 184!. Such unantici-
pated events can discredit existing institutions and policies, triggering
change ~Tilly, 1975!. As Katznelson ~1997! stated, the macro-analysis of
critical junctures that set countries along different developmental paths
has long been the bread and butter of historical institutionalism. How-
ever, the attribution of critical junctures only to big exogenous shocks is
not necessarily correct. Many less dramatic events, such as the urban0
rural divide, or class differences, could be found to constitute genera-
tive cleavages, contributing to change that is significant, swift and
encompassing.
Significant Change
Significant change is central to our understanding of critical junctures.
As such, an attempt must be made to measure the significance of any
change examined. Yet measuring significance will be difficult, as what
constitutes significant change will vary as a function of the cases stud-
ied. However, instead of arguing, as has been the case up to now, that
significant change must be a large event, and saying no more on the mat-
ter, this paper argues for the establishment of standards to enable the
identification of the level of significance of change. We are attempting
to introduce the concept of a more rigorous approach, without becoming
overly rigorous to the point where the approach would be rendered of
limited applicability. First, standards must be employed in measuring the
level of change, and these should be clearly defined, and logical to the
subject under examination. An operational definition measuring signifi-
cance will have to indicate where the list comes from, and demonstrate
that it was exhaustive and the values were mutually exclusive ~Shoe-
maker et al., 2004!. Ultimately, the levels set will be dependent upon the
researchers’ understanding of their topic, but setting out such standards
will inculcate an inherently more rigorous approach than has existed up
to now.
Swift Change
As we are dealing with critical junctures, periods of significant change,
we assume that the change is not a long, slow process. Otherwise, we are
dealing with incremental change. We must reject the notion of incremen-
tal change if we intend to address radical change. As a consequence, we
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add the notion of swiftness to our understanding of a critical juncture:
the significant change must take place quickly.
Encompassing Change
The influence of the critical juncture must be encompassing. That is, it
must have an effect upon all, or most, of those who have an interest in
the institution or institutions it is impacting upon. In this regard we could
be talking about things as vastly different as the populations of whole
countries, the export community, ethnic minorities, all those working
within a ministry, or the elderly pensioners in a society. Thus, we assume
that for a change to be a critical juncture, its effects must impact upon a
certain minimum percentage of those concerned. What this percentage
could be would depend on the topic under examination.
The remoulded approach will enable us to better explain, and under-
stand, past events. It will allow us to see clearly where change was incre-
mental, and where it constituted a critical juncture, thus removing the
mystery surrounding the issue of watersheds in politics. For Thelen ~2000:
101! a critical juncture is environed by its location within a temporal
field, its place within a sequence of developments. In this case, temporal
context is central to our understanding of a critical juncture. Therefore,
each critical juncture must be unique. This is the difficult part, in trying
to establish standards, and bring a level of rigour that is universally appli-
cable, for an area of research marked by its uniqueness.
This definition of a critical juncture gives rise to four possible sets
of findings ~see Figure 2!. Only in the top left-hand box is a critical junc-
ture possible. In any of the other locations in the diagram, the conditions
for a critical juncture are not met. In the lower left-hand box, a genera-
tive is not identified, but the criteria for change ~significant, swift and
encompassing! are spelled out. This relates to a situation in which the
nature of the change examined conforms to the criteria for a critical junc-
FIGURE 2
The Critical Juncture Grid
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ture, but the generative cleavage examined does not. Such a finding points
to the possibility of an alternative generative cleavage to the one hypoth-
esized, encouraging the researchers to re-examine their hypothesis. In
the lower right-hand box, neither a generative cleavage nor at least one
of the criteria for change is identified. In the top right-hand box a gen-
erative cleavage is identified but, again, at least one of the criteria for
change is absent.
A framework within which to analyze critical junctures is of vital
importance; in its absence, arguments as to what is, and what is not, a
critical juncture are questionable. The objective in setting out the frame-
work is to allow researchers to systemize their approach to examining
potential critical junctures. This addresses the uncertainties regarding crit-
ical junctures not answered by earlier approaches. The remoulded criti-
cal junctures approach adds a tool to the historical institutional toolkit,
allowing for a more coherent researching and understanding of past events.
With this in mind we turn to an empirical example.
Case Study: Proposed Critical Juncture—Ireland 1987
In 1987 the Irish economy was in serious difficulty. The government,
desperately seeking a solution, turned to politicized industrial relations
at the national level. This witnessed a change in the ICTU’s influence
over public policy, with its recognition by the government as a “social
partner.” With this development, the “union leaders secured access to gov-
ernment they had never previously enjoyed” ~MacSharry and White, 2001:
130!. The question this case study seeks to answer is whether this change
in the ICTU’s influence over public policy constituted a critical juncture,
or was it merely a case of incremental change?
In this instance, the generative cleavage being tested for is a macro-
economic crisis. However, what constitutes a macro-economic crisis is
highly subjective in economics. Consequently, a range of various indica-
tors will be utilized to enable us to reach a conclusion on the state of the
economy. We will examine some of the main indicators of economic per-
formance to see if they were at decade-long lows. In this regard, at least
four of these indicators should have been at decade-long lows to indicate
a macro-economic crisis. Account will also have to be taken of contem-
poraneous economic assessments by economists, newspapers, the central
bank and international economic monitoring institutions. The opinions
and actions of elected representatives will also have to be taken into con-
sideration. If these diverse groups all considered the economy to have
been in crisis, then there is a good chance that it was. Consequently, con-
sideration of all this information should enable us to reach an informed
decision on the state of the Irish economy in 1987.
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In testing for change in the ICTU’s influence over public policy, we
are looking for significant, swift and encompassing change in different
aspects of the relationship between the ICTU and government. This analy-
sis will examine changes in the unions’ policy preferences and relative
power over public policy. The indicators employed are designed to mea-
sure the extent of what Baccaro ~2002: 6! called “concertation” or “social
partnership” as practiced in Ireland. They are related to, or derived from,
the various dimensions upon which corporatism, corporatist bargaining
and union strength can be measured ~Hermansson, 1993; Nordby, 1994;
Golden et al., 1999: 198!, as well as the various dimensions that com-
bine to define an industrial relations system ~Archer, 1992: 377!.
In this regard, swift is taken to refer to change occurring within
12 months of the proposed generative cleavage. We reject the notion of
slow incremental change as we are seeking radical change. Encompass-
ing requires that the change impacts upon at least 75 per cent of those
with an interest in that change, in this case the membership of Irish
trade unions. However, the criteria for significant change shall be par-
ticular to each of the observable factors utilized here. These factors will
encompass many aspects of the relationship between the unions and
government.
If the ICTU’s rate of meetings with the prime minister increased
by over 50 per cent within 12 months of the generative cleavage it is
considered significant, while the significance of change in cabinet atti-
tudes towards the ICTU shall be more subjective. If the ICTU’s repre-
sentation on government committees increased by over 50 per cent, it
became involved in a tripartite agreement, and its membership increased
by over 3 per cent, all within 12 months of the generative cleavage,
then these factors would be considered significant. Measuring the sig-
nificance of changes in the government’s policy towards organized labour,
and the level of ICTU policies incorporated into government policies,
will be more subjective. Nevertheless, these changes will have to occur
within 12 months of the generative cleavage, and have an impact upon
most trade union members. Finally, change in the government’s eco-
nomic policies, as identified by organizations monitoring economic per-
formance, and in the unions’ influence over policy making, as identified
by policy commentators, will be considered. This information should
enable us to conclude whether there was a change in the ICTU’s influ-
ence over public policy, and if this change was significant, swift and
encompassing.
If there was a macro-economic generative cleavage and significant,
swift and encompassing change in the ICTU’s influence over public pol-
icy in 1987, then a critical juncture has been identified. Should any one
of these conditions not be fulfilled, then we are not dealing with a crit-
ical juncture.
668 JOHN HOGAN
Testing for a Generative Cleavage
By 1987 the Irish economy, stagnating throughout the 1980s, was in seri-
ous difficulty, characterized by very high unemployment. The economic
indicators for debt0GNP and unemployment had reached decade-long
lows, while those for inflation, GDP growth, days lost to industrial dis-
putes and economic openness, although not at decade-long lows, were
far from impressive ~Appendix A!. When taken as a whole, the eco-
nomic indicators pointed to an economy in trouble.
There was unanimity in both the domestic and foreign media con-
cerning the economy. The Irish Times used the term “battered” to de-
scribe the economy in February 1987,1 while according to the Irish
Independent, the manufacturing industry was in serious crisis, with
one in six jobs having disappeared between 1980 and 1987.2 The Econ-
omist pointed out that “the people of Ireland were deeply in debt to
the outside world, three times as much per head as Mexico.”3 During
the long recession of the 1980s, “the government @had# borrowed vast
sums, and spent them on welfare services that could be sustained
only by more borrowing.”4 Thus, a vicious circle of indebtedness was
eating at the economy while the national debt spiralled upwards. The
Irish Times noted that some economic commentators were advocating
debt repudiation in light of the scale of indebtedness.5 Overall, the
general consensus in the newspapers, as voiced by the Irish Indepen-
dent, was one of stagnation and crisis.6 The Economist weighed in by
stating that “by 1987 the Irish economy was universally seen to have
reached nadir.”7
Irish economists, concerned with the economy, delivered severe crit-
icisms of policy and performance. Kennedy and Conniffe ~1986: 288!
observed that “it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Irish economic
performance has been the least impressive in Western Europe.” The Eco-
nomic and Social Research Institute ~ESRI! agreed that Irish economic
performance had been appalling throughout the first half of the 1980s.
Bradley and Fitzgerald ~1989: iii! pointed out that from 1980 to 1987,
growth averaged only 0.5 per cent per year, while the national debt dou-
bled to over £23 billion, 40 per cent of which was sourced abroad.
Unemployment, which had risen rapidly during the 1980s, peaked at a
historic high of 17.7 per cent in 1987, with a total of 254,526 people out
of work ~Daly, 1994: 122!. Ireland had reached the unenviable position
of topping the European unemployment league.8
The economy was looked upon with pessimism by the Central Bank.
Its quarterly economic reports foresaw no immediate prospect for an
improvement in either growth or employment.9 More worryingly, the Cen-
tral Bank argued that the economic situation did not permit for increases
in welfare benefits to needy members of society.10 Consequently, the
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increasing level of poverty, resulting from the depression, was eroding
the lives of a growing segment of the population.11
According to the OECD ~1987: 11–15!, between 1979 and 1987 Irish
economic performance had been dire: slow growth, rapidly deteriorat-
ing public finances, stagnation of per capita disposable income, huge
balance of payments deficits, industrial relations turmoil and a large drop-
off in domestic demand. As the OECD ~1987: 77! put it, “by the mid-
1980s a number of acute imbalances confronted the Irish economy.” These
imbalances were also making the business community extremely wor-
ried. Leading businessman Tony O’Reilly warned of the dangers of IMF
involvement, and of the loss of Irish economic sovereignty, if the eco-
nomic crisis was not dealt with.12
In this context of economic despair, the government sought to build
support among the economic and social interests for a national recovery
strategy. In 1986 a National Economic and Social Council ~NESC! report,
A Strategy for Development 1986–1990, predicted that existing govern-
ment policies would lead to further emigration, deterioration of the
public finances and reduced flexibility for policy makers. The report
emphasized the necessity of a national plan to tackle the public expendi-
ture crisis. At the time, politicians of all political hues were coming to
the same view. They all realized that something had to be done to improve
the situation. Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald acknowledged that “the
national debt and interest payments were rising faster than national
income, and constituted a vicious circle.”13 He regarded the debt burden
as a set of handcuffs binding the country with high taxes and interest
rates,14 while the opposition leader, Charles Haughey, remarked that “the
economy is at a total stand-still.”15 The general election of February 1987
saw all political leaders making the case for fiscal rectitude,16 with
Haughey stressing that the primary issue of the election was economic
recovery.17
Testing for Significant, Swift and Encompassing Change
In 1987, the ICTU’s access to the prime minister underwent dramatic
transformation. In the years prior to 1987, the trade unions had met with
Prime Minister Garrett FitzGerald on only a few occasions, and those
encounters had generally been unproductive ~FitzGerald, 1991: 454!.
However, after winning the general election of February 1987 the new
prime minister, Charles Haughey, met with the ICTU on four occasions
that year. Whereas the previous Fine Gael-Labour coalition government
had been less than convinced of the merits of national tripartite agree-
ments ~Redmond, 1985!, Fianna Fáil, even prior to the election, had
embarked on a strategy of wooing the unions. It sought to involve them
in policy discussions, as it regarded this as vital for imposing fiscal dis-
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cipline. Most of the meetings between the prime minister and the ICTU
were concerned with the government’s plans for economic recovery, and
how the union movement could contribute to this in a manner that was
mutually beneficial to both them and the economy.18 As a result of these
meetings, “the Taoiseach @prime minister# invited the unions, along with
the other major social partners @including the employers# , to take part in
an effort to spur @economic# recovery by means of consensus” ~Mjoset,
1992: 383!.
The Fianna Fáil government adamantly supported a centralized pay
agreement on account of its perceived benefits to the economy in terms
of industrial peace, and the trade unions’ commitment to support a series
of painful, but necessary, spending cuts.19 By 1987, after six years of
decentralized agreements, the unions themselves were predisposed to
return to centralized pay determination ~Roche, 1994a: 180!. For them,
the point of departure was the wish to regain influence over issues like
jobs and social policies on inequality. They also wanted a say in the mea-
sures taken against unemployment, improvements for workers on low pay
and some concessions on taxation ~Hardiman, 1992: 348!. They saw a
centralized pay agreement as a means of preventing Ireland going down
the Thatcherite road where the unions had been excluded from power
~Allen, 1997: 170!. The prospects for national agreements on very mod-
erate pay rises also drew the employers into the negotiations for what
became the Programme for National Recovery ~PNR!.
The PNR was to see the reintegration of the union movement into
the public-policy-making process. Three joint government-ICTU work-
ing parties, on employment and development measures, taxation and
social policy, were set up as a result of the PNR.20 A ministerial-ICTU
group was also established to meet monthly and review progress on the
economy.21 These committees and working parties, along with direct
ICTU access to the Department of the Taoiseach ~Farrell, 1993: 178–
79!, ensured ongoing dialogue between the government and social part-
ners on economic and social policy issues ~O’Donnell, 1998: 11!. In
1988 the prime minister met with the ICTU on four occasions,22 while
the years thereafter were to witness a continual increase in the number
of such meetings. Although the number of government committees on
which the ICTU was represented did not change substantially at this
time, the unions had secured an input into public policy making through
their role as an essential constituent within the PNR, with rights of rep-
resentation on state boards, committees and policy forums. This stood
in stark contrast with the ICTU’s lack of access to the prime minister,
other senior ministers and influential committees during the first half
of the 1980s.
The level of union policies incorporated into the government’s pol-
icies towards organized labour changed in 1987.23 Up to 1986 the unions’
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policies, along with their policy demands, had regularly been ignored by
the government. During the mid-1980s, Congress sought the provision
of more training for young people; however, the government reduced fund-
ing.24 Congress’s demands for increased taxation of farmers, to ease the
burden on industrial workers, were ignored, as were its pre-budget sub-
missions. The government brought forward its own policies, and then
invited Congress’s observations after the fact. However, in March 1987,
the government increased income tax allowances, as the unions had
demanded.25 This constituted an important event, as thereafter ICTU pol-
icies on pay, tax and social welfare were all incorporated into the PNR.
Their incorporation into the PNR ensured that the government would
maintain the overall value of social welfare benefits in subsequent
budgets.26 This was in stark contrast to the budgets of the mid-1980s,
that did little for organized labour. Along with righting the economy,
the unions’ demands for job creation were placed at the top of the
government’s agenda, and prioritized by every relevant organization, and
institution, in the state. After 1987, the trade unions’ policies were find-
ing their way into the government’s policies towards organized labour.
Hence, the essence of the tripartite agreement reached in 1987 was inclu-
siveness and accommodation.27
The social partnership shifted the Irish political economy from a Brit-
ish towards a European mode of consensus between social partners.
“These arrangements re-established a reciprocal relationship between Con-
gress @ICTU# , the government, and employers on a much stronger insti-
tutional footing than heretofore” ~Girvin, 1994: 130!. From 1987 onwards
the ICTU was to play a central role in the formulation of government
economic and social policies, initially through the PNR, and subsequently
through the central agreements that followed it. These tripartite agree-
ments emphasized macro-economic stability, greater equity in the tax sys-
tem and enhanced social justice. “In the decade after 1987, interest group
activity in Ireland attained centre stage, with the tripartite agreements of
the 1990s cementing social partnership” ~Murphy, 1999: 291!. These
agreements showed how closely the union movement had become involved
in policy making. “Ireland’s social partnership approach @was# one of the
most significant developments in public policy in the European Union”
~NESF, 1997: 9!.
The steady decline in the level of Irish trade union membership was
also arrested in 1987088. Rising unemployment and deepening recession
had seen the unions suffer their most serious fall in membership since
the Second World War ~Roche, 1994b: 133!. In 1987 union membership
fell by 14,100, or 2.8 per cent ~Roche, 1994a: 61!. This left 468,600
trade unionists in the Republic of Ireland, a decrease of 76,600, or more
than 14 per cent, since 1980. However, in 1988 trade union membership
increased for the first time since 1980, reaching 470,500 ~Roche and
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Larragy, 1989!. Although an increase of only 0.4 per cent, this marked
the beginning of a turnaround for the union movement. Over the fol-
lowing years the ICTU’s membership grew substantially, reaching over
700,000 by late 2005.
In summation, the years leading to 1987 saw the Irish economy sink-
ing deeper into recession. By 1987, continuation with the economic pol-
icies employed throughout the early 1980s was no longer viable. The view
that the economy was in crisis was unanimously shared by the national
media, political and economic commentators, the central bank, domestic
and international organizations monitoring economic performance, and
elected representatives.
In an effort to resolve the economic problems, the Irish political
establishment opted for an inclusive and consensual approach. The gen-
eral election of early 1987 saw a new Fianna Fáil administration come to
power, determined to right the economy. This administration employed a
new approach towards the trade unions that was to ultimately see the
union movement involved in policy consultation with the reinstitution of
centralized bargaining. Consequently, the ICTU’s access to the Tao-
iseach, representation on government committees, government economic
and industrial relations policies, the trade unions’ influence on govern-
ment policies, ministerial attitudes, and the overall level of trade union
membership, all changed in the unions’ favour, with government policies
in particular coming to reflect those advocated by the unions. Most of
these factors underwent significant and swift change, and the fact that
they impacted upon the ICTU made them encompassing, as that body
represented over 95 per cent of all Irish trade unionists.
This brief case study shows that there was a significant, swift and
encompassing change in the ICTU’s inf luence over public policy in
1987, at a time when the country’s economy was in crisis. This change
in the ICTU’s influence over public policy constituted a critical junc-
ture. The occurrence of this critical juncture closed off a range of
alternative paths that could have been chosen by the actors in the time
preceding it.
FIGURE 3
Critical Juncture Grid—Ireland 1987
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Conclusion
Historical institutionalism explores the conditions under which insti-
tutions evolve. The approach has developed rapidly over the past
decade with the adoption of new techniques, becoming more dynamic,
seeking to break away from focusing either on institutional reproduc-
tion or institutional change. A variety of mechanisms have been intro-
duced to examine the subtle, yet significant, changes that occur within
institutions. Yet some of the earlier concepts used for examining change,
which are now falling from favour, were underspecified. One of these
was the concept of critical junctures, a concept vital to our understand-
ing of the starting points of analysis, thus solving the infinite regress
problem.
In political science, few tools exist with which to make sense of
institutional change ~Thelen, 2003: 234!. Katznelson ~2003: 283! points
to this deficiency, arguing that scholarship has yet to move purposefully
in this direction. Into this desolate environment any new or revised instru-
ments should be welcomed. This paper sought to improve on the critical
junctures approach. The remoulded approach, as set out and tested above,
provides a clearer means of examining change. In the case study of change
in the ICTU’s influence over public policy, in 1987, criteria are set out to
enable us to see if the change constituted a critical juncture. The remoul-
ded critical junctures approach possesses clarity, and a focus on context,
that was previously lacking. With this approach it is easy to see what is a
critical juncture, and why, reducing uncertainty surrounding the concept.
The approach identifies what Aminzade ~1992: 463! called the “key choice
points.” The remoulded approach is applicable to any research con-
cerned with change, raising the prospect of more wide-ranging research
using the approach.
It is important that analysts become clearer as to the meaning of
critical junctures. If the concept continues to be used loosely, the study
of watershed events will probably amount to nothing more than a
pointing to events that appear important. This article provides political
scientists with conceptual and methodological tools for avoiding this
error.
This addition to our body of theory provides greater leverage for
analyzing the particular aspect of social reality encapsulated by critical
junctures. This conforms to the need to place politics within context,
within time ~Pierson, 2004: 178!. It can help political scientists think
more clearly about the role of time and history in social analysis. This
offers exciting opportunities for correcting common mistakes and silences
in contemporary social science. It will enable us to strike a more effec-
tive and satisfying balance between explaining the general and compre-
hending the specific.
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Appendix A
Ireland’s Main Economic Indicators, 1977–1997
Year Unemployment Inflation
Government
debt to
GNP ratio
Growth
rates in
real gross
domestic
product
Industrial
disputes
days lost
~thou!
Economic
openness
1977 8.8 13.6 61.4 6.9 442 102.0045
1978 8.1 7.6 63.5 6.7 613 103.7894
1979 7.1 13.2 70.65 2.4 1465 109.601
1980 7.3 18.2 71.91 1.9 412 106.4831
1981 9.9 20.4 77.45 1.1 434 105.0999
1982 11.4 17.1 86.53 0.7 434 97.81183
1983 13.6 10.5 97.60 1.6 319 101.7349
1984 15.4 8.6 106.28 2.3 386 112.7388
1985 16.7 5.4 108.60 0.8 418 112.172
1986 17.1 3.8 123.26 1.1 309 101.1026
1987 17.7 3.1 124.07 4.6 264 104.8707
Source: Leddin, Anthony J. and Brendan M. Walsh, 1998. The Macroeconomy of Ireland, 4th
ed. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan.
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